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Stone v. Powell and the Effective Assistance of Counsel 
Since Stone v. Powell, 1 state prisoners who have been afforded 
"an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a fourth amendment 
claimt__may_not .obtain federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of 
that claim.2 Courts3 ancrcommentators4 have frequently speculated 
about the applicability of Stone to other constitutional claims, but 
most courts have rejected proposals to extend its holding to cases not 
involving the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.5 Disagreements 
have arisen, however, among courts that have considered sixth 
I. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
2. 428 U.S. at 494. Authority to review petitions for habeas corpus in federal court was 
expressly granted by Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). Section 2254(a) provides: 
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall ·entertain 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 
In Ex parle Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830), the Supreme Court held that the 
scope of§ 2254's predecessor statute was limited to attacks on the jurisdiction of the court that 
confined the habeas petitioner. For a variety of perspectives on the writ's subsequent expan-
sion, see Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Copus far Stale Prisoners, 16 
HAR.v. L. REv. 441, 463-99 (1963); Brennan, Federal Habeas Copus and Stale Prisoners: An 
Exercise in Federalism, 1 UTAH L. REv. 423 (1961); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collat-
eral A/lack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 151-57 (1970); Hart, Foreword: 
'llze Time Chari of the Justices 'I7ze Supreme Court, 19.58 Term, 13 HARV. L. REV. 84, 101-22 
(1959); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court- /fabeas Copus, 64 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1966); 
Reitz,FederalHabeasCopus: ImpactofanAbortiveStateProceeding, 74HARV. L. REv. 131S, 
1354-57 (1961); .Developments in the Law- Federal Habeas Copus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 
1042-72 (1970). 
Stone provoked an extensive and generally critical reaction in the literature. See, e.g., 
Boyte, Federal Habeas CopusAfler Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Only For The Arguably Inno-
cent?, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 291 (1977); Green, Stone v. Powell: The Hermeneutics of the Burger 
Court, IO CREIGHTON L. REv. 655 (1977); Robbins & Sanders, Judicial Integrity, the Appear-
ance of Justice, and the Great Writ of Habeas Cop/I!: How lo Kill 1wo Thirds (or More) With 
One Stone, IS AM. CRIM. L. REv. 63 (1977). 
3. See Browder v. Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 258-59 n.1 (1978); Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 (1977) 
(Powell, J., concurring); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, S06-15 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
4. See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, .Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Copus and the Court, 86 
YALE LJ. 1035, 1086-100 (1977); Schulhofer, Coefesslons and the Court, 19 MICH. L. REv. 865, 
887-91 (1981); Tague, Federal Habeas Copus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The 
Supreme Court Has Work lo .Do, 31 STAN. L. REv. I, 29 n.141 (1978). 
S. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); 
Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1978); Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d 
Cir. 1978); United States ex rel Henne v. Fike, 563 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1072 (1978); Greene v. Massey, S46 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel Hudson 
v. Warden, No. 74-C-2392 (N.D. ID. June 30, 1981); Toliver v. Wyrick, 469 F. Supp. S83 (W.D. 
Mo. 1979) (dictum); Sedgewick v. Superior Court, 417 F. Supp. 386 (D.D.C. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); cf. Hussong v. Warden, 623 F.2d I 185 (7th Cir. 1980) (Stone inap-
plicable to exclusionary rule imposed by federal wiretapping statute). But see Richardson v. 
Stone, 421 F. Supp. S77 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Stone applies to Miranda claims). 
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amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel6 based on an 
attorney's failure to raise or incompetent presentation of a fourth 
amendment issue in pretrial proceedings or at trial. Although inef-
fective assistance claims are generally cognizable in habeas corpus 
proceedings,7 at least one court has applied Stone and denied relief 
when the alleged incompetence involved a fourth amendm~nt issue. 8 
Other courts have distinguished these sixth amendment claims from 
the fourth amendment issue presented in Stone and thus have sanc-
tioned habeas corpus relief.9 
This Note supports the latter view: Courts should not invoke 
6. See note 62 i'!fra. 
7. See, e.g., Cuylerv. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 
1981); Eldridge v. Atkins, 665 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3780 (Mar. 
30, 1982); Perez v. Wainwright, 640 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3780 
(Mar. 30, 1982). But cf. Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation In Criminal Cases: Depar-
tures From Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. R.Ev. 927, 970-83 (1973) (proposing alternative remedies 
for ineffective counsel, obviating justification for habeas corpus). 
8. See Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1978) (Chapman, J., concur-
ring in result) (dictum); LiPuma v. Commissioner, Dept. of Corrections, New York, 560 F.2d 
84, 93 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1978); Allah v. Henderson, 526 F. Supp. 
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally Bines, supra note 7, at 976. In addition, the Ninth Circuit 
recently indicated that it considers the issue open and may soon resolve it. See Moran v. 
Morris, 665 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1981). 
9. See Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 640-41 (4th Cir. 1978); Moran v. Morris, 478 
F. Supp. 145, 151 (C.D. Cal. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 665 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1981). 
The failure of a prisoner's attorney to raise a fourth amendment claim in a manner pre-
scribed by state procedural rules imposes an additional obstacle to federal habeas review on 
that ground. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a state 
procedural default bars federal habeas corpus absent a showing of "cause" for the violation 
and resulting prejudice to the defendant. 433 U.S. at 90-91. The Supreme Court has offered 
little guidance as to what "cause" will entitle a defendant to federal collateral review, see 
Engle v. Isaac, 50 U.S.L.W. 4376, 4386 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91, and the lower federal courts have struggled with the issue. See 
generally Goodman & Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30 
HAsT. LJ. 1683 (1979). 
Several habeas petitioners have argue!,l that attorney ineffectiveness should constitute 
"cause." While the Fifth Circuit has held that unsubstantiated allegations of counsel incompe-
tence are insufficient, see Washington v. Estelle, 648 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1981); Tyler v. Phelps, 
643 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1981), other courts have found that "cause exists when the record 
reveals attorney error affecting substantial constitutional rights of the defendant." United 
States v. Brown, No. 77-2106, slip op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. March 21, 1980). See Boyer v. Patton, 
579 F.2d 284, 288 (3d Cir. 1978); Sincox v. United States, 571 F.2d 876, 880 (5th Cir. 1978); 
Rinehart v. Brewer, 561 F.2d 126, 130 n.6 (8th Cir. 1977); Tolliver v. Wyrick, 469 F. Supp. 583, 
602 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (alternative holding); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 
70, 214 (1977); cf. Note,Attomey Ellor as "Cause" Under Wainwright v. Sykes: The Case for a 
Reasonableness Standard after Washington v. Downes, 67 VA. L. REv. 415 (1981) (attorney 
error need not breach constitutional standard to constitute "cause"); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391, 470-71 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging importance of competent 
counsel to adequacy of state procedural ground). But see Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 
843 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane) (Oakes, J., concurring). This view finds apparent support in 
the Supreme Court's recent application of Wainwright in Engle v. Isaac, 50 U.S.L.W. 4376 
(U.S. Apr. 5, 1982). Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, noted that while alleged un-
awareness of a constitutional objection is not excusable cause for a procedural default, the 
Constitution guarantees "a fair trial and a competent attorney." 50 U.S.L.W. at 4383 (empha-
sis added). Moreover, the Engle court asserted that victims of a "fundamental miscarriage of 
justice" would be able to meet the cause and prejudice standard, citing Justice Stevens' concur-
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Stone's bar of habeas corpus relief against a prisoner whose ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim is evidenced by his attorney's mis-
handling of a fourth amendment issue. Part I briefly identifies the 
considerations underlying the Stone Court's decision to limit habeas 
corpus review of fourth amendment claims. Part II then argues 
against applying Stone to the sixth amendment claim. After estab-
lishing the analytic di.ff erence between the two constitutional claims 
and examininB Stone's "opportunity for full and fair litigation" stan-
dard, it concludes that Stone is fully consistent with free review of 
habeas corpus petitions alleging incompetent handling of fourth 
amendment questions. Finally, responding to a popular interpreta-
tion of Stone, Part II demonstrates that the possibility that ineff ec-
tiveness claims may not further the determination of a defendant's 
factual guilt or innocence should not preclude their review in habeas 
corpus proceedings. 
I. THE UNDERPINNINGS OF STONE V. Po WELL 
Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder after the Calif omia courts 
denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in an allegedly un-
constitutional search.10 In his petition for a federal writ of habeas 
corpus, Powell argued that the evidence should have been ex-
cluded.11 The district court denied the writ, but the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed, holding that because the statute under which Powell was 
arrested and searched was unconstitutionally vague, the evidence ob-
tained was inadmissible.12 In Stone v. Powell, 13 the Supreme Court 
reversed. It held that habeas corpus relief was not available since the 
state had given the defendant an "opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion" of his fourth amendment claims.14 
ring opinion in Wainwright, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4383. Justice Stevens, in several passages, recog-
nized the importance of counsel competence. 433 U.S. at 94-97 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
This Note contends that fourth amendment claims and sixth amendment claims evidenced 
by fourth amendment errors are distinct; the Wainwright issue is separate and beyond the 
scope of this Note. Indeed, one commentator has concluded that Wainwright is likely to lead 
habeas petitioners to challenge counsel competence on sixth amendment grounds rather than 
raise other substantive claims now barred. See Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective 
Representation of Counsel· The Supreme Court Has Work To Po, 31 STAN. L. REV. I (1978). 
10. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 470 (1976). 
I I. See 428 U.S. at 470. 
12. See 428 U.S. at 470-71. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is reported at 507 F.2d 93 (1974). 
13. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Stone was decided together with Wo!!f v. Rice. Rice was con-
victed of murder in a Nebraska state court after his motion to suppress certain evidence was 
denied. See 428 U.S. at 471-72. Rice filed for federal habeas corpus relief, alleging that the 
search that uncovered the disputed evidence was illegal. Both the district court and the Eighth 
Circuit agreed with Rice, holding the search invalid because the search warrant failed to estab-
lish probable cause. 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975); 388 F.Supp. 185, 190-94 (D. Neb. 1974) 
(citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 
(1964)). The Supreme Court held that Rice, like Powell, had been afforded an opportunity for 
full and fair litigation and reinstated his conviction. 428 U.S. at 496. 
14. 428 U.S. at 494. 
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Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Stone, initially posited 
that criminal defendants have no constitutional right to the exclusion 
of evidence acquired in violation of the fourth amendment.15 The 
exclusionary rule, he argued, is a judicial "remedy'' for illegal 
searches and seizures16 that exists primarily to deter violations of the 
fourth amendment.17 In contrast to the rule's effectiveness when in-
voked at trial and on direct review, 18 excluding evidence on federal 
collateral attack is far less likely to deter illegal police activity.19 The 
Court rejected the "dubious assumption that law enforcement au-
thorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws in 
a search or seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal."20 
After questioning the utility of applying the exclusionary rule in 
habeas corpus proceedings, Justice Powell argued that the rule im-
poses significant societal costs.21 He observed that exch~ded evi-
15. 428 U.S. at 482-89; see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 399, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-62 (1961) (Black, J., concurring); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: 'Why 
Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978). But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 
(1967) ("Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless 
invasion of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of 
the fruits of such invasions."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651, 657 (1961); Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (''the imperative of judicial integrity''); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an 
"Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978); 
Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 
59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974). See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SElZURE § 1.1 (1978). 
16. 428 U.S. at 486. The victim of the illegal search is not the remedy's beneficiary. The· 
exclusionary rule "is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the 
search or seizure, for any '[r)eparation comes too late.'" 428 U.S. at 486 (quoting Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965)). 
17. 428 U.S. at 486. But see United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 557-58 (1975) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
18. The effect of the exclusionary rule on illegal police activity is a disputed question. 
Compare Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary R;ule in Search and Seizure, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 
(1970) and Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its 
.Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973), with Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing 
Health? Some New .Data and a Plea .Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681 (1974), 
and Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique 
of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 740 (1974). 
19. See 428 U.S. at 494-95. But see Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Ex-
amination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 453 n.104 
(1980). 
20. 428 U.S. at 493 (footnote omitted). Ignored in the Court's discussion and by many 
commentators is the exclusionary rule's symbolic value. See Tiffany, Judicial Atlel11JJIS to Con-
trol the Police, 61 CURRENT HlsT. 13, 52 (1971) (In considering whether the Court should 
scrap the exclusionary rule ''it may be important to distinguish between the functional and 
symbolic impact of a rule designed to control behavior. From a functional perspective, the 
Mapp rule may be a failure. It need not follow that the rule should be changed if one can find 
, in it sufficient symbolic worth.''). 
21. 428 U.S. at 490. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) 
(Burger, CJ., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 
Friendly, Is Innocence Illelevant? Collateral .Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 
142, 161 (1970); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, SO TEXAS L. 
Rl!v. 736 (1972). But see K. BROSI, A CROSS-9ITY COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESS-
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dence is generally reliable and often the most probative of a 
defendant's guilt or innocence.22 When evidence is excluded, guilty 
defendants may go free. The exclusionary rule thus distracts from 
the "ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the cen-
tral concern in a criminal proceeding."23 In light of these costs, the 
Court has applied the rule only ''where its remedial objectives are 
thought most efficaciously served."24 Balancing the costs of impos-
ing the rule against the small increase in deterrence that might result, 
the Stone Court limited the power of federal courts to consider 
fourth amendment claims on habeas corpus review. 
Justice Powell also objected to the breadth of federal habeas 
corpus itself.25 Before Stone, state prisoners could obtain full review 
of their federal statutory and constitutional claims in a habeas 
corpus proceeding.26 Stone created an exception to this broad power 
of review; federal habeas courts can reexamine the merits of a fourth 
amendment claim only if the state did not afford the defendant an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation of that claim.27 
The majority grounded its concern with the scope of federal 
habeas corpus on four specific policy interests. First, federal habeas 
review exacerbates federal-state tension by giving a single federal 
judge broad authority to invalidate..decisions of state courts.28 Sec-
ond, federal habeas review undertllines 
1
finality in state criminal tri-
als by prolonging the pursuit of absolute truth.29 Third, Stone may 
ING 18-19 (1979) (cited inY. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 221-22 (5th ed. 1980)); U.S. GAO, REPORT OF THE COMPI'ROLLER GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF THE ExcLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECU-
TIONS (1979). 
22. 428 U.S. at 490. But see Tushnet, Judicial Revision oJ the Habeas Corpus Statutes: A 
Note on Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 484, 496-500. 
23. 428 U.S. at 490 (footnote omitted). 
24. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (holding that the government may 
use illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings). See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 
62 (1954) (illegally seized evidence admissible at subsequent trial to impeach defendant's 
testimony). 
25. See 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. Justice O'Connor recently articulated many of the arguments 
against broad access to federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. See Engle v. Isaac, 50 
U.S.L.W. 4376, 4381-82 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1982). 
26. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 515-33 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976); Bator, 
supra note 2, at 444; Friendly, supra note 2, at 155; Hart, supra note 2, at 106. See generally 
Developments, supra note 2, at 1042-62. 
27. 428 U.S. at 494 & n.37. 
28. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-65 (1973) 
(Powell, J., concurring); cf. Wainwright v. Skyes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (asserting the need to 
make state trials the "main event" in the criminal justice system). But see Chisum, In lJefense 
oJ Modem Federal Habeas Corpus far State Prisoners, 21 DE PAULL. Rev. 682, 693 (1972); 
but cf. Cover & Aleinikoff, JJialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 
1035 (1977) (describing "dialogue" between utopian federal courts and practical state courts 
defining individual rights). 
29. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 261-63 (Powell, J., 
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have suggested a narrower purpose for habeas corpus: Justice Pow-
ell's opinion indicates that its primary goal may be "to assure that no 
innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty."3° Fi-
nally, the Court was concerned that the prisoner petitions generated 
by the availability of full habeas review contributed significantly to 
the overcrowding of federal court dockets. 31 
Stone, then, rests on two ideas that intersect when a state prisoner 
seeks federal habeas corpus relief on fourth amendment grounds -
a balancing of the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary 
rule in federal habeas proceedings and a concern for the breadth of 
federal habeas review generally. Part II addresses whether these 
considerations justify extending Stone's rule, to sixth amendment 
claims. 
II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FOURTH AND SIXTH 
AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
Habeas corpus petitions alleging that an attorney mishandled a 
fourth amendment-claim involve two distinct constitutional viola-
tions. The first, an illegal search or seizure, was committed by the 
police before the defendant's trial. The second violation, however, 
occurred during the trial, when the attorney's incompetence denied 
the defendant his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.32 This Part of the Note argues that while the first violation 
is covered by Stone, the second is not. 
concurring); Bator, supra note 2, at 452-53. But see Lay, Modem Administrative Proposals for 
Federal Habeas Corpus: The Rights of Prisoners Preserved, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 701, 709-10 
(1972): 
Sober reflection upon why we have devised a system which allows a continual ques-
tioning of its processes discloses that our purpose is not so much to remove the discom-
forting doubt or to achieve the ultimate assurance, as it is to give safeguard to rights not 
readily visible or easily acknowledged .... We would not send two astronauts to the 
moon without providing them with at least three or four back-up systems. Should we 
send literally thousands of men to prison with even less reserves? . . . [W]ith knowledge 
of our fallibility and a realization of past errors, we can hardly insure our confidence by 
creating an irrevocable end to the guilt-determining process. 
On the effect of a lack of finality on prisoners' efforts toward rehabilitation, see remarks by 
Freund in Symposium: Habeas Corpus-Proposals for Reform, 9 UTAH L. REv. 27, 30 (1964); 
Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and .Due Process: A Response to· Professor Mishkin, 33 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 719, 744 (1966). 
30. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. (emphasis added) See generally Part II C iefra. 
31. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 260-61 (Powell, J., 
concurring); Friendly, supra note 2, at 143-44, 148-51. See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 15-54 (1973); Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 66 A.B.A.J. 
295,297 (1980); Burger,Agendafar 2000A . .D. -A NeedfarSystematicAnticipation, 70 F.R.D. 
83 (1976); Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska Commis-
sion), Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations far Change, 61 F.R.D. 195, 394-
409 (1975); Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 HARv. L. REV. 321 
(1973). 
32. See notes 38-39 i'!fra. 
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A. The Evidentiary Role of Fourth Amendment Violations 
At least one court has expressed its unwillingness to find a signifi-
cant difference beween fourth amendment claims and the sixth 
amendment claim that this Note considers. In LiPuma v. Commis-
sioner,33 trial counsel neglected to make a pretrial motion to sup-
press evidence seized during an allegedly illegal search. When the 
motion was made at trial, the state court held it untimely. At his 
sentencing, the defendant, represented by different counsel, re-
quested a new trial on the ground that his previous attorney had 
acted incompetently. The court denied the motion, and the appellate 
court affirmed the conviction without an opinion.34 In federal 
habeas corpus proceedings, the prisoner alleged ineffective assistance 
of counsel and was granted relief. 35 The Second Circuit applied 
Stone and reversed, finding that the state courts' full and fair consid-
eration of the petitioner's sixth amendment claim barred federal col-
lateral relief.36 Despite the ostensible difference in the claims, Stone 
applied because "at the heart of [the] case lies an alleged fourth 
amendment violation . . . [to which] a sixth amendment claim has 
been added for good measure."37 
On close examination, however, the two claims differ signifi-
cantly. The relevant considerations in ineffectiveness claims are the 
seriousness of the attorney's error and the resulting prejudice to the 
defendant.38 Courts generally assess these claims by measuring the 
attorney's performance against community norms or a standard of 
reasonable competence.39 When the allegation of incompetence 
33. 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1978). 
34. See 560 F.2d at 88. 
35. See United States ex rel Rosner v. Commissioner, New York State Dept. of Correc-
tions, 421 F.Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), revd. sub nom. LiPuma v. Commissioner, Dept. of 
Corrections, New York, 560 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1978). 
36. 560 F.2d at 93 n.6. 
37. 560 F.2d at 93 n.6. A district court in the Second Circuit has since rejected the argu-
ment that LiPuma should "be limited either to the situation of a less than egregious sixth 
amendment violation or a blatant attempt to evade Stone." Allah v. Henderson, 526 F. Supp. 
282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
38. See United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Decoster, 
624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.) (plurality) (en bane), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); Davis v. Ala-
bama, 596 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated as moot, 446 U.S. 903 (1980); Cooper v. Fitzhar-
ris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. 
Williams, 575 F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978); McQueen v. Swenson, 
498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89,315 N.E.2d 878 (1974). 
See generally Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 1053 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note]; Note, Identifying and Remedying Inef-
fective Assistance of Criminal Pefanse Counsel· A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 752 (1980). 
39. See Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.) (en bane) ("the skill, judgment and 
diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980); 
United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (Leventhal, J.) ("the per-
formance ordinarily expected of fallible lawyers"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); Cooper v. 
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rests on the failure to assert a right or defense, courts apply the stan-
dard- to determine whether the attorney should reasonably have been 
aware of the right or defense and, if so, whether his omission was 
justified.4° Failure on either count indicates that the attorney did not 
satisfy the constitutional standard of effectiveness. 
By relying on StoJ?e and failing to consider the sixth amendment 
violation, the LiPuma court mischaracterized the relevance of the 
fourth amendment violation. The search and seizure question 
should be relevant only as evidence of incompetence, not as an in-
dependent basis for habeas relief.41 The question in assessing the at-
torney's performance should be whether, according to the relevant 
standard, a competent lawyer would have made a timely objection.42 
Despite several restrictions, the exclusionary rule is undeniably 
available at trial and in pretrial proceedings.43 Indeed, Mapp v. 
Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (''reasonably competent and effective 
assistance of counsel"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 
1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1978) ("within the range of competence expected of attorneys in criminal 
cases"); United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 887 (5th Cir.) (''reasonably likely to render and 
did render reasonably effective counsel"}, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978); Marzullo v. Mary-
land, 561 F.2d 540, 544-45 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States ex 
rel Ortiz v. Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377,379 (7th Cir. 1976) (''the minimum standard of professional 
representation"); Unted States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976) (''the customary 
skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circum-
stances"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); United States v. Toney, 527 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 
1975) ("reasonably likely to render and does render reasonably effective assistance"), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) ("exercise 
of the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place"). De-
spite a barrage of scholarly criticism, see, e.g., Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and 
Argersinger, 64 GEO. LJ. 811 (1976); Erickson, Standards of Competency far Defense Counsel 
in a Criminal Cos~ 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 233, 237-39 (1979); F~er, Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1077 (1973), the Second Circuit requires an attorney's incompe-
tence to make the trial a ''.farce and mockery of justice" to establish a sixth amendment viola-
tion. See United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 477 (2d Cir. 1980). ~ 
40. Irrespective of the particular governing standards, courts refuse to second guess tactical 
decisions. See United States v. Miller, 643 F.2d 713, 714 (10th Cir.,1981); United States v. 
Alvarez, 626 F.2d 208, 211 (1st Cir. 1980); Rutledge v. Wainwright, 625 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (5th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1033 (1981). _ 
41. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 55-60 (1970) (Harlan; J., concurring); United 
States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434·U.S. 844 (1977); Kinnel 
v. Kansas, 509 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (D. Kan. 1981); United States ex rel Watson v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 326 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Pa. 1971), qffd sub nom. Unite!I States ex rel Watson v. 
Lindsey, 461 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1972); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 4~ 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. 
Rptr. 863 (1963). . _ 
42. See Pinnell v. Cauthron, 540 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1976); Finer, supra note 39, at 1098-
100; Columbia Note, supra note 38, at 1079-83. 
43. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 
(1976) (''We adhere to the view that [deterrence of unconstitutional p~lice conduct and incul-
cation of fourth amendment ideals] support the implementation of t!:te exclusionary rule at 
trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state-court convictions."); Israel, Criminal Proce-
dure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Wallen Court, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1404-15 
(1977); Seidman, supra note 19, at 452-53. 
Nevertheless, there has been movement toward adopting a "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule. In United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981), the Fifth Circuit held that evidence acquired through police 
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Ohio44 requires exclusion of illegally seized evidence at these stages 
of the criminal justice process. Courts must look to the strength of a 
fourth amendment argument in these contexts when evaluating inef-
fectiveness claims. Whether a petitioner may raise the search and 
seizure issue in habeas corpus proceedings is irrelevant; that question 
depends not on the merits of his fourth amendment claim, but on 
whether he had an opportunity for full and fair litigation in state 
court. The LiPuma approach, · by failing to distinguish the two 
claims, extends Stone without considering whether that extension ef-
fectuates the goals of the Supreme Court. 
A practical distinction between fourth and sixth amendment 
claims militates against extending Stone. Justice Powell argued that 
the remoteness of collateral proceedings from police activity dimin-
ished the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect; the rule's functional 
justification suffered accordingly.45 In the sixth amendment context, 
however, remoteness may have beneficial rather than detrimental 
ramifications. State trial judges may be reluctant to "soil the reputa-
tions" of attorneys who practice before them frequently by branding 
their work "ineffective."46 Subsequent review in a separate federal 
conduct taken with a "reasonable, good-faith belief that it was proper'' is admissible notwith-
standing its illegality. 622 F.2d at 846-47. See generally Ball, Good Faith and the• Fourth 
Amendment: Tlte "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM, L. & CRIMI· 
NOLOGY 635 (1978). Several other courts have indicated their approval of the Williams rule or 
some variation on it. See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582, 593-96 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(Adams, J., concurring); United States v. Nolan, 530 F. Supp. 386, 398 (W.D. Pa. 1981); State 
v. Mincey, 636 P.2d 637, 648-51 (Ariz. 1981) (en bane); People v. Pierce, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 
1102, 1110, 411 N.E.2d 295, 301, 307 (1980); Richmond v. Commonwealth, No. 80-Ca-1366-
MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 31, 1981); State v. Lehnen, 403 So. 2d 683 (La. 1981) (dictum); People 
v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 422 N.E.2d 537, 541, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877, 881 (1981); Green v. State, 
615 S.W.2d 700, 709-13 (fex. Crim. App. 1981) (McCormick, J., dissenting); Holloman v. 
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947,949,275 S.E.2d 620,622 (1981) (by implication); Jessee v. State, 
640 P.2d 56, 66-67 (Wyo. 1982) (Thomas, J., concurring). Moreover, in an article severely 
critical of Williams, two commentators concluded that a majority of the Supreme Court, in-
cluding Justice O'Connor, favor some form of a good faith exception. See Mertens & Wasser-
strom, Foreword: Tlte Good Faith Exception lo the Exclusionary Rule: .Deregulating the Police 
and .Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. LJ. 365, 370-71 & n.32 (1981). 
In addition to these judicial developments, several legislative efforts seek the same result, 
One bill, currently pending in Congress, includes a provision that would prohibit suppression 
of evidence in federal criminal proceedings unless the law enforcement official intentionally or 
substantially violated the fourth amendment. See S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3505(a), 127 
CONG. REc. Sl54 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1981). Courts will determine if violations are "substan-
tial" by considering the deterrent effect of suppression, the extent of the invasion of privacy, 
whether the violation was reckless, and whether, but for the violation, the evidence would have 
been discovered. S. IOI,§ 3505(b). In addition, the Colorado legislature has enacted a form of 
the good faith exception while similar bills are pending in Montana and California. See Mer-
tens & Wasserstrom, supra, at 369-70 n.29. 
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
45. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 (1976). 
46. See Bazelon, supra note 39, at 822. The more general question of the relative compe-
tence of state and federal courts in adjudicating federal constitutional claims is a matter of 
dispute among commentators. Compare Aldisert; Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A 
Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1972 LAW & Soc. 
ORD. 557, 559, and Lay, supra note 29, at 716, with Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 
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forum may thus offer more effective implementation of the right to 
adequate counsel.47 
Nevertheless, several judges48 and commentators49 have ex-
pressed concern for the breadth of habeas review and have suggested 
that Stone might appropriately be extended to other constitutional 
claims.so One judge has expressed fear that Stone will be "swept 
aside" if federal courts freely review the sixth amendment claims 
that this Note considers.st The next section examines Stone more 
closely and concludes that, rather than undermining the decision, 
federal habeas review of the sixth amendment claims is fully consis-
tent with its rationale. 
B. The Importance of Effective Assistance of Counsel 
The Stone Court limited the availability of habeas corpus relief 
for fourth amendment violations because it believed that the social 
costs of excluding reliable evidence outweighed any additional de-
terrence that might be gained52 and because it was concerned that 
the federal collateral review of state criminal trials was overbroad.s3 
But the Court did sanction de novo review when the petitioner had 
no opportunity for full and fair litigation in the state courts. 54 "On 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 945, 948 (1964), and Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. llOS 
(1977). The Supreme Court has refused to recognize a distinction between the competence of 
state and federal courts. See Allen v. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976). See generally Note, Beyond Custody: Expanding Collateral Re-
view of State Convictions, 14 U. MlcH. J. L. REF. 465, 470-72 (1981). 
41. C:f. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 563 (1979) ("Federal habeas review is necessary to 
ensure that constitutional defects in the state judiciary's grand jury selection procedure are not 
overlooked by the very state judges who operated that system. There is strong reason to believe 
that federal review would indeed reveal flaws not appreciated by state judges perhaps too close 
to the day-to-day operation of their system to be able properly to evaluate claims that the 
system is defective."). 
48. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259-61 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 232-42 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536-37 & n.8 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring); Sallie v. North Carolina, 
587 F.2d 636, 641-42 (4th Cir. 1978) (Chapman, J., concurring); Friendly, supra note 2, at 143-
44; Lay, supra note 29, at 704. 
49. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 2, at 441-62; Doub, The Case Against Modem Federal 
Habeas Corpus, 51 A.B.A.J. 323 (1971); Miller & Shepherd, New Looks al an Ancient Writ: 
Habeas Corpus Reexamined 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 79-86 (1974); Weick, Apportionment of the 
Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus be Eliminated?, 21 DE PAULL. 
REv. 740 (1942); Note, Relieving the Habeas Corpus Burden: A Jurisdictional Remedy, 63 IOWA 
L. REv. 392 (1977). 
SO. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 587-88 n.10 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in judg-
ment); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 336-37 n.9 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judg-
ment); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); Brewer, 430 U.S. 
at 426-29 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
51. Sallie v. North Carolina, 587 F.2d 636, 641 (4th Cir. 1978) (Chapman, J., concurring). 
52. See notes 15-24 supra and accompanying text. 
53. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text. 
54. See notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text. 
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its face," one commentator has observed, "this qualification is puz-
zling."55 The costs of excluding reliable and probative evidence are 
the same regardless of whether the petitioner had a full and fair op-
portunity to litigate his claim. And "[s]ince the state court's putative 
denial of an opportunity for a fair hearing occurs after the fourth 
amendment violation has taken place, it is hard to see how that de-
nial has any impact at all on the deterrent efficacy of the rule."56 To 
the extent that a complete prohibition on review of fourth amend-
ment claims would have further limited the availability of federal 
habeas corpus, the full and fair hearing qualification ensures that 
Stone incompletely safeguards the Court's expressed concerns for 
finality in criminal trials, comity, and manageable federal caseloads. 
The qualification is not, however, wholly inexplicable. Stone re-
affirmed the availability of the exclusionary rule at trial and required 
states to provide an opportunity to litigate fourth amendment claims. 
To guarantee defendants this minimum level of procedural fairness, 
the Court authorized federal habeas courts to review these claims 
when the state procedures were inadequate.57 The "opportunity for 
55. Seidman, supra note 19, at 456. Professor Seidman continues: 
Surely [the full and fair hearing qualification] makes little sense if one reads Stone as 
establishing the discernment of factual guilt or innocence as a core value. The exclusion-
ary rule is quite obviously equally truth-denying whether or not the defendant has had an 
opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment claim in state court. But the qualification is 
not easily comprehensible even if one reads Slone • • • as resting on a judgment regard-
ing the utility of the exclusionary rule in different contexts. 
Id Bui cf. Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Only far the Argu-
ably Innocent?, ll U. Rica. L. RBv. 291,316 (1977) (Stone standard ''necessary to avoid total 
frustration of even the minimal deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule"). 
56. Seidman, supra note 19, at 456. 
To be sure, if a state had a consistent policy of declining to enforce the rule on direct 
review, that policy might seriously detract from the rule's deterrent impact and so necessi-
tate federal intervention. But the Slone Court nowhere suggests that a defendant must 
demonstrate such a policy to justify habeas review. Taken at face value, the Court seems 
to be saying that the mere isolated failure of the state court to provide an opportunity for 
a hearing in the defendant's case is sufficient to support federal habeas intervention. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
57. The Court failed to explain fully the meaning of "opportunity for full and fair litiga-
tion," providing instead a "cf' reference to Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.36 (1976). Townsend established criteria for determining when 
federal courts should hold evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus proceedings. Sec 312 U.S. at 
313. Most lower federal courts, however, have declined to make Townsend the "sole measure" 
of Stone's standard. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Houle, 618 F.2d 877, 881 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 901 (1980); Sanders v. Oliver, 611 F.2d 804, 807 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 827 (1980); Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1977); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 
F.2d 1204, 1211-12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977). Nevertheless, although factual 
and procedural variations make generalizations difficult, the contours of "opportunity for full 
and fair litigation" have become more apparent in several respects. First, habeas petitioners 
are not entitled to "correct" resolutions of constitutional issues as determined by federal 
courts. See Palmigiano v. Houle, 618 F.2d at 882-83; United Sfates ex rel Maxey v. Morris, 
591 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979); Swicegood v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 
1322, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978). Bui cf. Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 
1978) ("fair'' opportunity includes ''recognition and at least colorable application of the correct 
Fourth Amendment constitutional standards."). Indeed, in Slone itself, and in Wo!lf v. Rice, 
its companion case, Federal Courts of Appeals had found constitutional violations. See notes 
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full and fair litigation" standard is thus best explained as reflecting 
the Court's traditional insistence 9n a minimum core of procedural 
rights without which defendants cannot be fairly tried.58 
10-14 supra and accompanying text. Second, courts generally find that an accused's failure to 
pursue state review or comply with state procedural prerequisites to such review does not 
establish the absence of an "opportunity for full and fair litigation." See, e.g., United States ex 
rel Maxey y. Morris, 591 F.2d at 389-91; Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1265 (4th Cir. 
1978); Caver v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1188, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1978); Gates v. Henderson, 568 
F.2d 830, 837 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978). But see Sanders v. 
Oliver, 611 F.2d 804, 808 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980) (Stone "opportu-
nity" includes procedural opportunity to raise claim and a "full and fair" hearing); Dunn v. 
Rose, 504 F. Supp. 1333, 1335-38 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). See generally <;:omment, Habeas Corpus 
After Stone v. Powell: The "Opportunity for Full and Fair Litigation" Standard, 13 HARv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. R.E.v. 521 (1978); Note, The "Opportunity" Test ef Stone v. Powell: Toward a 
Redefinition ef Federal Habeas Corpus, 23 VILL. L. R.E.v. 1095 (1978); Comment, .Development 
ef Federal Habeas Corpus Since Stone v. Powell, 1979 WIS. L. R.E.v. 1145. 
Courts have provided differing signals regarding the role of counsel error and post-Stone 
review of fourth amendment claims. In Gates the court held that a mere procedural opportu-
nity would not invoke the Stone bar where an ''unconscionable breakdown" in the state's 
processes had occurred. 568 F.2d at 840. The Third Circuit, applying the caveat, has indicated 
that an inadvertent but justifiable error by an apparently competent attorney that time-barred 
a suppression hearing denies a defendant an "opportunity for full and fair litigation." Boyd v. 
Mintz, 631 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1980). Counsel error rising to constitutional proportion would 
seem a fortiori to entitle a habeas petitioner to federal collateral review. See generally Straz-
zella, Indfective Assistance ef Counsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19 Aruz. L. R.E.v. 433, 
480-82 (1977). On the other hand, the principles illuminating Stone adopted by the Fifth Cir-
cuit suggest a contrary inclination. In Caver v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (5th Cir. 
1978), the court asserted that it is ''the existence of state processes allowing an opportunity for 
full and fair litigation of fourth amendment claims, rather than a defendant's use of those 
processes, that serves the policies underlying the exclusionary rule" and justifies Stone. Wil-
liams v. Brown, 609 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1980). The Williams court went further, holding 
that a state court's refusal to hear the defendant's argument on the erroneous belief that it had 
already been litigated in prior state proceedings did not allow federal habeas review. 609 F.2d 
. at 220. "[l]n the absence of allegations that the processes provided by a state to fully and fairly 
litigate fourth amendment claims are routinely or systematically applied in such a way as to 
prevent the actual litigation of fourth amendment claims," Stone requires foreclosure of fed-
eral habeas corpus. 609 F.2d at 220 (emphasis added). Under the Williams analysis, specific 
instances of attorney error seem no more likely to warrant habeas review than an error by a 
state court. While this Note contends that sixth amendment claims evidenced by fourth 
amendment errors are beyond Stone's reach, the arguments leading to that conclusion, see 
notes 54-58 and accompanying text, also suggest that a defendant has not received an "oppor-
tunity for full and fair litigation" when represented by counsel whose performance falls below 
constitutional standards. 
58. q: Seidman, supra note 19, at 456-59 (concluding that "[t]he 'full and fair hearing' 
qualification is a direct outgrowth of Professor Bator's insistence that the central role for 
habeas corpus is not to assure that federal questions are correctly decided, but to assure that 
they are decided by procedures calculated to reach a correct decision."). The Court has explic-
itly distinguished ''those rights that protect a fair criminal trial (from] the right guaranteed 
under the Fourth Amendment." Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973). A fair 
trial includes the right to a lawyer, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), who fur-
nishes "adequate legal assistance," Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); see Engle v. 
Isaac, 50 U.S.L.W. 4376, 4383 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1982), the right to a speedy trial, see Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); the right to a jury trial, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968), the right to confront hostile witnesses, see Barber v. :Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), and the 
right to be free from double jeopardy, see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 237-38. 
Professor Bator has characterized federal habeas corpus as a vehicle for policing ''the integ-
rity of the processes" by which state courts convict defendants to ensure ''full and fair litiga-
tion." Bator, supra note 2, at 458-59. Admittedly, Professor Bator qualifi.ed this proposition by 
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The Court has always recognized that "the Constitution guaran-
tees [ certain rights] to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair 
trial."59 The sixth amendment right to counsel occupies a prominent 
position among those basic rights. 60 "Of all the rights that an ac-
cused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the 
most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he 
may have."61 The right to counsel, moreover, includes the right to 
effective legal assistance.62 Writing for the majority in Cuyler v. Sul-
livan,63 Justice Powell unequivocally asserted that states may not 
conduct "trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend 
themselves without adequate legal assistance."64 
Justice Powell's majority opinions in Stone and Cuyler contain 
complementary themes. Notwithstanding its limit on a defendant's 
procedural arsenal, Stone mandates concern for the fairness of state 
trials. Cuyler indicates that effective legal representation is essential 
to that end. Accordingly, any sixth amendment claim, including one 
arising from incompetent handling of a fourth amendment issue, im-
plicates the fairness of state proceedings - an interest entirely con-
sistent with Stone and one that the federal courts should continue to 
review. Indeed, because federal courts can no longer fully review the 
merits of state court rulings, a habeas court should be especially con-
cerned with the quality of a defendant's representation during the 
recognizing that state courts and the Supreme Court on direct review could perform the same 
function. Yet this assertion seems to ignore the Court's inability to review adequately federal 
claims denied in state proceedings, see Hart, supra note 2, at 96; Stolz, Federal Review of Stale 
Court .Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need far Additional Appel/ale Capacity, 64 CAL. L. 
REv. 943, 950-59 (1976); Tushnet, supra note 22, at 492-96; .Developments, supra note 2, at 
1061; cf. Boag v. MacDougall, 50 U.S.L.W. 3539, 3539 (Jan. 12, 1982) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (Supreme Court's decisions to accept cases should not be influenced by the merits of 
particular cases); SO U.S.L.W. at 3539 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the Supreme Court is not a 
forum for the correction of error), a problem which federal habeas corpus ameliorates. See 
Mishkin, Foreword· The High Court, The Great Writ, and the .Due Process of Time and Law, 
The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HAR.v. L. REv. 56, 86-87 (1965); Wright & Sofaer, Federal 
Habeas Corpus far Stale Prisoners: The A/location of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 Y ALB L.J. 
895, 897 (1966). 
59. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,237 (1973). In Schneckloth, the Court distin-
guished the strict ''knowing and intelligent waiver" standard required for these fundamental 
trial rights, such as the right to counsel, from the lesser "consent" standard required to author-
ize a police search. 
60. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
61. Schaefer, Federalism and Slate Criminal Procedure, 70 HAR.v. L. REv. I, 8 (1956), See 
Kamisar, The Right lo Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A .Dialogue on The Most Perva-
sive Righi of an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1962). The adversary system is premised on the 
availability of competent defense counsel See Schwarzer, .Dealing wltlt Incompetent Counsel 
-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HAR.v. L. REv. 633, 636-38 (1980). 
62. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) ("inadequate assistance does not 
satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to counsel"); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 
& n.14 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67-73 (1932). 
63. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
64. 446 U.S. at 344. 
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"main event" - the state trial. 65 
C. The Relevance of Guilt or Innocence 
Because evidence excluded from a criminal trial on fourth 
amendment grounds is "typically reliable," the Stone Court argued, 
"[a]pplication of the [exclusionary] rule . . . often frees the 
guilty."66 The Court's opinion in Stone was based, in part, on its 
reluctance to use habeas corpus relief to intrude on the guilt determi-
nation process in pursuit of fourth amendment values.67 Some com-
mentators have interpreted Stone to mean that only claims alleging 
constitutional violations that affect the determination of a defend-
ant's factual guilt or innocence should be fully cognizable in federal 
habeas corpus proceedings. 68 If a habeas challenge alleges a claim 
that does not go to the defendant's underlying guilt or innocence, 
habeas corpus would be unavailable unless there had been no oppor-
tunity for full and fair litigation in the state courts.69 But a majority 
of the Court has rejected this reading of Stone, and application of 
the "guilt-related" model of habeas corpus is inconsistent with the 
Court's opinions in the effectiveness of counsel area. 
Although one can find support for a guilt-innocence distinction 
in Justice Brennan's dissent in Stone,70 Professor Seidman has 
demonstrated persuasively that "Justice Brennan mischaracterizes 
the majority approach when he accuses it of reducing constitutional 
requirements to 'mere utilitarian tools,' designed solely to separate 
guilty from innocent defendants."71 The Court, moreover, appears 
to have rejected the guilt-innocence distinction originally drawn by 
Justice Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamante .72 InRose v. Mitchell, 73 
the habeas petitioner alleged racial discrimination in the selection of 
the grand jury that had indicted him. Since the petitioner had been 
65. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). 
66. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976). 
67. 428 U.S. at 489-96. 
68. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 467, 515-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cover & Aleinikoff, 
supra note 4, at 1086-100; Robbins & Sanders, supra note 2, 69-71; Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay 
v. Noia· Procedural Defaults hy Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. R.Ev. 341, 383 
& n.186 (1978); Tague, supra note 4, at 49-52. But see Boyte, supra note 55, at 297-306; Seid-
man, supra note 19, at 449-59. See generally Note, Guilt, Innocence and Federalism in Habeas 
Corpus, 65 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 1123 (1980). 
69. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 266 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). 
70. 428 U.S. at 515-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
71. Seidman, supra note 19, at 453. See note 55 supra. 
72. 412 U.S. 218, 266 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring): 
Where there is no constitutional claim bearing on innocence, the inquiry of the federal 
court on habeas review of a state prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim should be confined 
solely to the question whether the defendant was provided a fair opportunity in the state 
courts to raise and have adjudicated the Fourth Amendment claim. 
73. 443 U.S. 545 (1979). 
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found guilty by a properly chosen petit jury and had been afforded a 
full opportunity to litigate his discrimination clai,m in state court, 
Justice Powell believed that Stone. barred collateral review.74 Al-
though the petitioner's claim "had nothing to do with his inno-
cence,"75 a majority of the Court disagreed with Justice Powell's 
reading of Stone and held that equal protection challenges remained 
fully cognizable in federal habeas proceedings.76 The Court be-
lieved that federal review was necessary because the state trial sys-
tem itself, rather than the police department, was alleged to have 
violated the defendant's rights.77 
Rose stressed the special nature of equal protection claims, but its 
rationale also applies to ineffectiveness claims. In Cuyler v. Sulli-
van, 18 the Court permitted full habeas review of the sixth amend-
ment claim and never mentioned Stone as a possible limitation. The 
Court held that: 
[u]nless a defendant charged with a serious offense has counsel able to 
invoke the procedural and substantive safeguards that distinguish our 
system of justice, a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself. When 
a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial, it is the Stale 
that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty. 19 
Because allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel implicate the 
fairness of the state trial proceedings, Rose suggests that full federal 
habeas review of these claims should remain available. 80 
74. 443 U.S. at 579, 587 n.10 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). 
75. Seidman, supra note 19, at 454. 
76. 443 U. S. at 559-64. 
77. 443 U.S. at 561-64. 
78. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
79. 446 U.S. at 343 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
80. The Supreme Court's concern that ineffective counsel might also undermine the guilt-
determining process predates its opinion in Stone v • .Powell In McMann v . .Ricltardson, 397 
U.S. 159 (1970), decided six years before Stone, the Court held that a defendant could not 
attack the constitutionality of his own guilty plea in federal habeas proceedings by asserting 
that the plea was induced by a prior coerced confession. 397 U.S. at 771. But it added a 
significant caveat. After noting the role of counsel's advice in pleading decisions, the Court 
indicated that the guilty pleas would have been reviewable if the petitioner had alleged that his 
lawyer's advice fell outside of ''the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 
cases." 397 U.S. at 771. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-69 (1973). McMann thus 
premised its restriction of a state prisoner's access to collateral review on the assumption that 
he had received the assistance of reasonably competent counsel McMann provides important 
guidance for courts considering ineffectiveness allegations grounded on mishandled fourth 
amendment claims. Cf. Westen, Away From Waiver: A .Rationale far tlte Foifeiture of Consti-
tutional .Rights in Criminal .Procedure, 15 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1235-36 (1977) (state has greater 
interest in finality of convictions in guilty plea cases than those secured by trial). Like Stone v • 
.Powell, it significantly impaired access to federal habeas relief. Stone, like McMann, should 
be interpreted to rest on an assumption of legal representation consonant with constitutional 
standards. 
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CONCLUSION 
In Stone v. Powell, the Supreme Court identified the substantial 
societal costs and diminished benefits that result when federal courts 
impose the exclusionary rule in habeas corpus proceedings. Conse-
quently, the Court restricted habeas relief in the fourth amendment 
area to cases where a state had failed to provide the defendant an 
"opportunity for full and fair litigation." At least one federal court 
has applied Stone when a habeas petitioner alleged a denial of his 
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney did not competently object to introduction of illegally ac-
quired evidence. 
This extention of Stone is unwarranted. Courts should not con-
fuse evidence of an attorney's incompetence - the fourth amend-
ment error - with the underlying claim. The limit on collateral 
review of exclusionary rule claims is irrelevant in assessing the con-
duct of an attorney who failed to assert competently the search and 
seizure issue at trial. Free review of this sixth amendment claim, 
moreover, will not create a loophole in Stone. Instead of precluding 
all review of fourth amendment claims, the Stone Court preserved 
the right to habeas corpus when necessary to protect the defendant's 
opportunity to litigate his claims fully and fairly in the state courts. 
The Stone majority thus evinced its fundamental concern for a core 
of procedural rights that ultimately defines a fair trial. Effective 
assistance of counsel is essential to that end. 81 Review of sixth 
amendment claims, rather than undermining Stone, is fully consis-
tent with the values that generated its rule. 
81. The right to effective assistance of counsel could be termed a "truth-furthering right" 
- one ''that foster[s) sound guilt/innocence determinations with the requisite degree of cer-
tainty," Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 28, at 1092 (distinguishing such rights from truth-
obstructing and truth-neutral rights), and thus deserving of greater protection than the fourth 
amendment right at issue in Stone. 
